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CORPORATIONS-STANDARD OF VALUATION OF DISSENTERS' STOCK
UNDER APPRAISAL STATUTES-It was a well established rule at common law that fundamental changes in the character of a corporate
enterprise could be accomplished only with the consent of all of the
stockholders.1 However, the growth and development of modem corporations necessitated abrogation of this rule of unanimity. As a result,
state legislatures enacted statutes authorizing consolidations and mergers
with the consent of only a prescribed majority of the shareholders.2 It
was recognized that for business convenience, the majority group must
have power to determine the future course of the corporation's business
and yet the individual stockholder should not be forced to remain in
an enterprise substantially different from that in which he had originally invested. Therefore, provisions were adopted effecting a compromise between these divergent interests by giving the dissenters an
opportunity to withdraw from the corporation and to receive payment
of the appraised value of their shares.3
1 15 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., perm. ed., §7063 (1932); Nice Ball Bearing Co. v.
Mortgage Building and Loan Assn., 310 Pa. 560, 166 A. 239 (1933); Kean v. Johnson,
9 N.J. Eq. 401 (1853). These cases seem to base the rule on an nnplied contract between
the stockholders that the corporate assets shall be employed only for certain uses and they
recognize that the shareholders have a common ownership interest in the corporate assets.
In Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 41 S.Ct. 209 (1920), the
court considered an exception to the general rule where there is no reasonable prospect of
future earnings. The minority stockholders had several remedies. They might enjoin or
set aside the transaction or sue for the value of their shares on a theory of a wrongful
conversion of their interest in the corporation. See Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle
Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044 (1928).
2 The requirements of the different statutes vary. In Michigan, approval depends
upon a vote of shareholders representing two-thirds of the total number of shares of each
class of stock. 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.52.
3 A discussion of the general purposes of this type of legislation is found in Chicago
Corporation v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142 at 149, 172 A. 452 (1934). It has been suggested
that these appraisal provisions were motivated in part by a fear that without such provisions
these statutes authorizing fundamental changes in existing corporations might be declared
unconstitutional~ See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 700 (1946); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Railroad Co., 30 Pa. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685 (1858).
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The most difficult problem presented by this type of legislation is
the determination of an adequate standard of valuation for the dissenters' stock. At the outset, it should be recognized that there are two
separate elements of this problem. First, there is a need for a definition
of value which is a matter of substantive law and which will constitute
a delimitation of the rights of the dissenting shareholders. Second,
there is the matter of estimating the value of a particular share of stock
in a dollars and cents figure. This is a problem of evidentiary law. 4
Obviously, there must be a fairly precise definition of value as a prerequisite to an intelligent approach to the evidentiary problem. It is in
this respect that the existing statutory provisions are inadequate. Most
of the states make no real attempt to give a definition of value but speak
· genera1 terms of "fair
· va1ue, "5 " vaIue,"6 "fair
· cash va1ue,"1 "fair
·
1n
8
market value" or merely provide that the dissenter shall receive payment for his shares.9
As a result of this failure to provide an adequate legislative standard
for appraisal, when such a proceeding is instituted, the board of appraisers or the court:1 ° must determine not only the actual estimate of
the value of given corporate shares, but they must also attempt to define
the value concept suggested by the statute. This has the effect of increasing the burdens of this type of litigation and makes the appraisal
remedy an expensive one, thereby seriously impairing its effectiveness.11
The stockholder owning a small number of shares may be placed in a
position where he is forced to accept the merger plan or concede to the
settlement price offered by the corporation because he cannot withstand
the expense of a full hearing on the question. 12 On the other hand,
4 For an excellent general discussion of this valuation problem see 2 BommroHT, THE
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 811 (1937).
5 Iowa Code (1950) §491.112; ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 32, §157.70.
6 Del. Rev. Code (1935) §2093; 6 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1948) §25-236.
7 15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §21.54; 1 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §12:52.
s Cal. Corp. Code (1947) §4300. For a discussion of valuation under this statute see
40 CALIF. L. REv. 140 (1952).
9 In general the terms used in the statutory provisions have had little effect on the
results actually reached by the courts. For a general discussion of the various statutes see
Lattin, ''Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes," 45 HA.Rv. L.
REv. 233 (1931); Weiner, "Payment of Dissenting Shareholders," 27 CoL. L. REv. 547
(1927).
10 Most of the statutes provide for the appointment of a board of appraisers selected
by the parties. However, in some states the actual initial appraisal is made by the court.
11 For a very critical analysis of the inadequacies of these statutory provisions see
S.E.C. REPORT ON nm STUDY AND lNvBsTIGATION oF THE Woruc, AcnvrrIEs, PERSONNEL,
AND FUNCTIONS oF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION CoMMITTEES, Part VII, 590 at 604
(1937).
12 The states vary in the manner of assessment of costs of the appraisal proceeding.
Some require the corporation to pay them in all events. Others provide for a splitting of
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the corporation may be seeking the merger because of an unstable
financial position so that the threat of a prolonged appraisal proceeding
makes it vulnerable to coercive settlement negotiations. At any rate, it
does not present a situation where both parties may have a more or less
definite idea of their respective rights in a particular situation so that
fair and just negotiations may be made resulting in an extrajudicial
settlement.13 Lacking a clear definition of value in their present statutes, a number of alternatives have been considered by the courts of
the several states.

I. Judicially Recognized Standards
A. Hypothetical Dissolution and Distribution of Assets. Several
courts have equated the merger situation with a dissolution of the old
corporation and therefore rule that the value to which the dissenter is
entitled is the net asset value or "intrinsic value" of his shares.14 This
necessitates a general valuation of the physical assets of the corporation
to determine what the dissenter would receive if an actual liquidation
were effected.15 There is a logical difficulty in this approach in that an
analogy to a dissolution is paradoxical inasmuch as the purpose of the
appraisal statutes is, in a sense, to prevent a dissolution which may
otherwise result from an application of the common law rule of unanimity.16 This standard is also objectionable from the practical standpoint of increasing the burdens of the appraisal proceeding, for the
costs between the parties or assess them against the party whose contention as to value is
rejected. Also, it is not clear just what items will be included in recoverable costs. See
S.E.C. REPORT cited in note 11 supra. It is interesting to note that in Louisiana, where the
majority voting for the plan exceeds 80% of the voting power, dissenters have no right to
appraisal and payment. This would appear to be based on the idea that such small minorities are merely harassing the corporation. See La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §12:52.

13 A fair extrajudicial settlement is clearly the best solution to an intracorporate controversy. Some of the statutes recognize this fact by setting up procedural requirements
which force the parties to enter into negotiations. See for example the provisions in the
Ohio General Corporation Act, 6 Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1939) §8623-72.
14American General Corp. v. Camp, 171 Md. 629 at 637, 190 A. 225 (1936), reached
this result under a statute requiring appraisal at a "fair value." The court said the owner
was entitled to the " ••• aliquot proportion which the number of shares held would be
entitled to receive in the distribution of the net amount of the corporate funds in which
his particular kind of stock would be entitled to share." See also Petry v. Harwood Electric
Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 A. 302 (1924); Roessler v. Security Sav. and Loan Co., 147 Ohio
St. 480, 72 N.E. (2d) 259 (1947).
15 The usual procedure is to appraise all of the corporate assets, including good will,
and from the total of the asset values subtract all claims against the corporation having
priority over the stock being appraised and divide the result by the number of shares
outstanding.
16 Where there is a substantial minority preventing a merger or consolidation under
the common law rule, the only practical alternative is to agree to a dissolution.
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evidentiary problems of working out a hypothetical dissolution of a
large corporation would be enormously time-consuming and expensive.17 Furthermore, it is more in accord with the realities of this situation to say that the effect of the appraisal provision is forcing a sale of
the dissenter's interest in a going concern.18
Closely related to this standard of "intrinsic value" is the suggestion that the book value of the stock be taken as a minimum.19 This
is unsound since book value has almost no relation to actual worth of
the stock.20 Book value is often inflated or deflated for particular purposes irrespective of the actual earning power of the stock and the
assets of the corporation. Neither reproduction value nor carrying assets
at cost less depreciation reflects the essential element of the earning
capacity of the assets.
B. Market Quotations-Actual Market Price. If the particular stock
in question is a listed security on a national exchange and its market
quotation has been relatively stable for some time prior to the consolidation or merger, appraisal proceedings will seldom be instituted because the dissenting shareholder will usually accept the market value of
his shares. Therefore, these hearings ordinarily involve stock having a
B.uctuating market value or stock in a closely held corporation where
the shares are traded in small over-the-counter transactions. In both
of these situations, the adoption of actual market value as the general
standard of appraisal gives rise to difficulty. Actual market quotations
as determined from sales on the exchange will in many cases reB.ect the
influence of the plan for merger or consolidation. 21 Often such a trans17 In Matter of Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N.Y.S. (2d) 76, affd. without opinion
in 303 N.Y. 711, 103 N.E. (2d) 338 (1951), a New York court refused to consider net
asset value because the plaintiff's small interest in the corporation did not justify the
expense of a detailed asset valuation. This case is noted in 65 HARv. L. REv. 1243 (1952).
18 This idea received recognition in the Indiana statute which expressly provides that
the county courts in these appraisal hearings shall use the same practice and procedure, so
far as practicable, as that used under the eminent domain laws of that state. 6 Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1948) §25-236.
19 New Mexico has a special provision requiring that a dissenter be paid "the market
value of his stock which shall in no event be less than the book value of the stock according to the last balance sheet of the selling corporation" where the transaction involved is a
sale of the corporate assets. See 4 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §54-231. No such language
is found in §54-906 applicable to consolidations and mergers.
20 For a general criticism of book value as a valuation standard, see Borg v. International Silver Co., (2d Cir. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 147 at 152; 2 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATll AND
GIFT TAXATION §18.33 (1942).
21 See Robinson, "Dissenting Shareholders; Their Right tq Dividends and the Valuation of Their Shares," 32 CoL. L. REv. 60 at 73 (1932). The author points out the
extreme case of a market such as that of 1929-31 as an example of an abnormal market
which would make exchange quotations a completely unreliable valuation standard.
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action will be anticipated in the market months in advance of its actual
effectuation. Moreover, the taking of actual market price opens the
door to manipulation of the underlying market forces by the promoters
of the merger plan. In the case of the small corporation with closely
held shares, the fact that there are few sales of the stock obviously
precludes acceptance of the market value as an accurate appraisal of
their worth. Most courts recognize these factors and refuse to apply
market value as a general standard except in situations where the statute
expressly calls for it. 22
C. Value Enhanced or Diminished By Sale or Merger. Principles
of fairness would seem to dictate that the shares should not be valued
with consideration given to the effects of the proposed merger plan.
The dissenting minority should not be given the advantage of a legitimate transaction which they have objected to and attempted to frustrate. Neither should they be penalized by it. Therefore, whatever
standard is adopted, the shares should be valued as if the corporate
action which the dissenters decline to ratify had not been taken or contemplated. Several states have statutes which expressly provide that
the appraisers should exclude appreciation or depreciation of the shares'
value resulting from the merger. 23
D. General Methods Used by the Appraisers. Because of the confusion resulting from the failure to provide an adequate statutory definition of value, the ordinary appraisal proceeding is a complex aggregation of evidentiary detail. The appraisers will usually consider all of
the alternative standards of value and admit all evidence having a possible relevance to any of them. 24 Commonly the result reached will
constitute a compromise between several different possibilities, each
22 See Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142 at 150, 172 A. 452 (1934);
Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504 at 513, 113 N.E. 189 (1916); general collection of cases in
95 A.L.R. 922 (1935).
23New Jersey has such a provision. See N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §14:12--6: " ..• to
appraise the full market value of his stock, without regard to any depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence of the merger or consolidation." See also N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1941) §54-906.
2 4 Ahlenius v. Bunn & Humphreys, 358 ill. 155 at 168, 192 N.E. 824 (1934), presents a typical decision. There the court reviews a number of cases and concludes that, "A
situation is presented which calls for the exercise of judgment upon consideration of every
relevant evidential fact and circumstance entering into the value of the corporate property
and reflecting itself in the worth of corporate stock." Among the things which are ordinarily considered are earning capacity, dividends records, size of the accumulated surplus
applicable to dividends, general business record of the corporation and its prospects for the
future with relation to its position in the industry, value of the good will of the corporation, book value, etc. See cases collected in 162 A.L.R. 1237 (1946) and 174 A.L.R. 960
at 962 (1948).
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being given a certain definite weight. 25 Consequently, it is almost impossible to predict in advance the outcome of a particular proceeding.

II. Hypothetical Market Value as a Proposed Standard
Reference has already been made to the suggestion that thinking
on this valuation question may be clarified somewhat by dividing the
general problem into its constituent elements: ( l) a definition of the
rights of the dissenting shareholders, (2) a definition of the standard
by which these rights are to be measured, and (3) the actual measurement of these rights by an application of the standard of valuation.
The first two elements of this problem would seem to be a matter for
legislative determination while the third is clearly more of an administrative nature which will be the function of the appraisal boards and
courts. It has previously been pointed out that in most states at the
present time the entire problem is left with the courts. The judicial
process by its very nature is directed toward a determination of the
particular facts presented in the litigation before it and cannot adequately provide general guides to future action. 26 Therefore, an attempt
should be made to find a better solution on the legislative level.
Historically, judicial thinking on the rights of a corporate shareholder has followed the logical pattern of private property. The courts
have considered stockholders as proprietary owners of the corporate
business, contributing capital to the enterprise and sharing a common
ownership of the physical assets of the corporation.27 However, the
development of the corporate form of business enterprise has in reality
destroyed this concept. Control over the actual physical assets of the
corporation has been greatly centralized in the management group. 28
The economic concept of the corporation is that the management or
control group will take charge of the physical property of the corpora25 Thus in Re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480, 52 A. (2d) 6
(1947), the Delaware court appraised the stock by giving asset value 50% weight, market
value 25% weight and value based on estimated future earnings 25% weight.·
26 In most of the appraisal cases the courts expressly refuse to lay down a general
valuation standard and limit their opinions to the facts presented before them. See Ahlenius
v. Bunn & Humphreys, 358 ill. 155, 192 N.E. 824 (1934).
27 This would appear to be the basic philosophy· behind the common law rule of
unanimity.
28 Limitations of space preclude an extended discussion of this proposition. However,
consideration might be given to the present position of the individual stockholder with
regard to such matters as participation rights in corporate assets, the right to a fixed position
in a fixed capital structure, the right to invest additional capital in the enterprise, changes
in the corporate charter, and the general control over the future course of the business.
These matters are discussed in BERLE AND MEANs, THE MonERN CORPORATION AND PmVATE PROPERTY, chapters I, II, and ill of Book II (1932).
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tion and utilize it to produce earnings which may then be distributed to
stockholders. In practical effect, the modern stockholder is little more
than a risk-taker, a supplier of capital for a profit-seeking enterprise. 29
It would appear then that we are not really dealing with property in
the traditional sense and the logic applicable to the stockholder's interest in the corporation may also be changed. Actually, this has already
been done by the law without an express recognition of it. The very
matter giving rise to the appraisal problem is a tacit recognition of this
development. The legislature's provision that a merger or consolidation may be effected with less than unanimous approval of the shareholders is in itself a part of this separation of control from the individual stockholders. Therefore, it is suggested that the basic consideration
behind any proposed standard is that what the dissenting shareholder
must forego is the expectation of a participation in the earnings of the
corporation. This, in effect, is the interest which must be valued.
As a theoretical proposition, a dollars and cents appraisal of this
expectation of earnings is provided by the securities market. The
measure of worth given by the market is the result of agreement between a willing buyer and a willing seller, assuming that there is available an adequate supply of information upon which to make such an
appraisal. It is true of course that in practical effect there may be conditions and factors operating in the market which would upset this
theoretical determination. It would not be sufficient, then, in most
cases to accept the market quotations as the actual appraisal of corporate
shares. Yet, the fact that actual market value is not conclusive and is
not strictly accurate does not detract from the proposition that the general standard of value should correspond to a theoretical market appraisal. In a given case, the appraisers should ask: "Upon what price
would a willing buyer and a willing seller agree if no merger had been
contemplated?"30 Admittedly such a definition of value is quite general. However, it is clear that this matter does not admit of the establishment of a common mathematical formula.
Given such a standard with which to work, the appraisers may then
consider the relevant evidence in estimating such value in terms of
actual dollars and cents. The general methods used and the evidence
to be considered should correspond by and large to the methods used
29 This is the conclusion reached in BERLE AND MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See discussion in chapters V and VI of Book I and chapters VII and VIII of Book II.
89 This standard of valuation is suggested by Professor Bonbright. See 2 BoNBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 834 (1937).
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by investment bankers and securities brokers in evaluating stocks.
Where there is a market quotation on a national exchange, such price
would ordinarily constitute a starting point. It would then be in order
to consider the underlying elements of this price to determine whether
or not it has been influenced to any substantial degree by undesirable
factors. Clearly, the corporate earnings history will be important and
in-most cases there will be a heavy reliance on capitalization of earnings
and capitalization of dividends :figures. More evidentiary problems will
arise in the case of a small, closed corporation with unlisted securities,
but the same general standard of valuation should be helpful in such a
situation as a guide through the maze of evidentiary detail.
Some states have indicated a tendency to adopt this proposed approach to the appraisal problem. 31 Statutes calling for "fair market
value" seem to indicate an acceptance of this type of analysis. However, the decisions under such statutes do not give express recognition
to this general standard.32

Conclusion

It is submitted that hypothetical market value as a standard for
appraisal of a dissenter's stock in a merger or consolidation transaction
will make the statutory remedy a more meaningful one. While it does
not purport to be a precise formula for measuring value, it does provide
a general guide for determining the relevancy of possible considerations. This, it is hoped, will give more_ direction to these valuation
proceedings to the end that actual litigation on the question will be
somewhat more efficient and less burdensome. Moreover, it should
serve as a valuable aid to extrajudicial negotiation and settlement without undue coercion on either party. In this way, perhaps, the general
purposes of the appraisal statutes, i.e., a fair compromise between conHicting intracorporate interests, will be more fully realized.

Richard P. Matsch, S.Ed.
31 In a comment in 17 FoRDHAM L. REv. 259 (1948), the writer analyzes a group of
decisions under §21 of the New York Stock Corporation Act and concludes at p. 267 that
in New York the rule running through the cases is that "the value of the stock to be
appraised is what the stock will sell for in a normal market."
32 A number of cases decided under such statutes actually apply a net asset value
approach.

